Diplomatic SOCIETY spoke with Christian Wehrschütz about the challenges and opportunities surrounding Montenegro’s EU accession process.
How would you assess Montenegro’s chances of joining the EU by 2028?
I consider accession itself by 2028 unrealistic. At the time of this interview, we are already in mid-2026, and I do not think 1 January 2028 is realistic, if only because the accession treaty has to be ratified by all 27 EU Member States, a process that, based on experience, takes around two years.
I believe Montenegro has very good chances of completing the negotiations, potentially by the end of 2027. The accession treaty is already being drafted, which is a major indication that things are moving in that direction. But from a purely technical perspective, I do not think 2028 is achievable.
Montenegro has overcome many hurdles, but the crucial question is, of course, whether the ratification procedures will actually have been completed by then.
Perhaps I should add one more point. I consider it a fundamental mistake on the part of the European Commission, Montenegro and other candidate countries, as well as many EU Member States, that the focus is always placed exclusively on the homework that candidate countries have to complete. If you look at the Eurobarometer, there is a negative mood towards enlargement.
The worst-case scenario would be for Montenegro to complete the negotiations only for the process to subsequently fail because of a referendum in another country.
France is a particularly important factor in this respect and represents a significant hurdle. One reason is the high threshold in the National Assembly – I believe 80 percent support would be required – otherwise a referendum would be necessary.
France was also a brake on North Macedonia’s accession process. And the closer the French presidential election gets, the greater the reluctance is likely to become.
There was therefore an interesting possibility: had the referendum in Iceland at the end of August produced a positive result, Iceland could have resumed negotiations, which might have been concluded extremely quickly. We could then have had a modern industrialised country in the north and Montenegro moving forward as a package. But that hope was dashed by the Icelandic voters’ rejection in the referendum.
The question remains whether Albania can keep pace with Montenegro on the path towards the EU, particularly given Albania’s serious corruption problem.
What other challenges do you see for Montenegro?
Austria has two very good diplomats involved in this area. One is EU Delegation Head Johann Sattler, who has extensive experience in the Balkans, having worked in countries ranging from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Albania, and is working to advance this process.
The other is Georg Stawa, the justice attaché at the Austrian Embassy responsible for the Western Balkans. If you listen to both of them, and if you also speak with Montenegrins, it becomes clear that Montenegro has achieved a great deal in the area of judicial reform over the past two years.
The country has demonstrated that it is willing to pursue cases and has realised that even when highly corrupt politicians and officials are arrested and prosecuted, the sun still rises the next day. This represents an important change in mentality.
In other areas, there are technical issues, such as changes to electoral law. These are manageable, and the largest opposition party is also on board. So the technical side of the process is largely in place.
There are, however, two factors that must not be overlooked: domestic and foreign policy.
The first domestic factor is the Serbian ethnic community. It is now rather divided between one group that is firmly opposed to EU membership and is pro-Russian, and a second group – which also includes the Speaker of Parliament – that argues that the weaker Serbia’s European prospects become, the more important it is for Montenegro to support the country’s own path towards the EU.
The second factor is the Serbian Orthodox Church, which was highly independent under Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović. Following his death, there were attempts to bring the metropolitanate more firmly under the control of Belgrade. I can nevertheless see certain tendencies indicating that the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro does not want everything to be dictated to it from Belgrade. This is now also taking on a political dimension.
Serbia effectively has no realistic EU accession perspective in the foreseeable future. It remains to be seen how the Serbian political establishment will react if the “lazy southern brother” overtakes the big brother and joins the EU, and whether this will happen without resistance or attempts to create obstacles.
We must not forget that the Balkans are a highly sensitive region. We still have a Croatian-Montenegrin relationship that, due to the legacy of the wars accompanying the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, is not entirely free of emotion.
There are therefore many opportunities for obstruction and provocation. The major advantage is that Serbian-Croatian relations are currently as poor as they have been for a long time. For this reason, the Croatians may not be inclined to recklessly block Montenegro’s EU accession negotiations, which they could also regard as another building block in the process of national consolidation.
It is a process involving many factors that cannot simply be taken for granted. Nevertheless, I believe Montenegro has genuinely good prospects if its political leadership understands what is at stake.
One should not forget that parliamentary elections will be held in Montenegro in June 2027, which will also have an impact. By then, Montenegro will truly be standing at the gates of the EU, and you do not change horses in the middle of a river. This could provide another impetus towards completing the process.
What is the mood among the Montenegrin population, given that the process has already been under way for quite some time?
The population is overwhelmingly in favour of EU membership; there is no question about that. We should not forget that EU accession would also represent a success story for a small country – even more important in some respects than NATO membership. NATO membership was a political project that also faced considerable opposition, but it did not require a referendum. All opinion polls show that a large majority supports European integration.
What would Montenegro’s accession mean for the EU?
There would be several benefits for the EU, and they would be even greater if Albania were able to join as well. A look at the map shows that Montenegro’s accession would effectively complete the EU’s Adriatic coastline, with the exception of the small Bosnian stretch around Neum. That would leave only Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and North Macedonia outside. I see two positive factors for the EU. First, it could demonstrate that the EU still has a certain degree of attractiveness. Second, Montenegro’s accession would send a message to other countries that EU enlargement is not merely empty rhetoric. The major problem in countries such as Serbia and North Macedonia is the credibility that has been lost. In North Macedonia, the situation is even more difficult, because even after the country changed its name, EU accession negotiations did not begin. It takes time and it is complicated, but enlargement is still alive. Ultimately, the stabilisation of the Balkans can only be achieved through EU integration, not through NATO membership alone.
How significant is the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and does it still matter to people in Montenegro?
Yes, because it is the genuinely relevant church. Many people who identify as Montenegrin are also members of the Serbian Orthodox Church. It transcends national borders.
Secondly, it is important because there are also pro-Russian currents within the church.
It should also not be forgotten that, apart from the DPS, the party of Milo Đukanović, the Serbian Orthodox Church is essentially the only organisation in Montenegro that has a significant nationwide infrastructure and financial resources. For that reason, it is important to have the Serbian Orthodox Church on board in these processes as well.
And is that more or less the case at the moment?
It cannot simply be answered with yes or no. Đukanović lost the elections at the time, not least because of his conflict with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Under the current government, an agreement was subsequently reached concerning the church’s legal status and property rights in Montenegro. At least beyond broader socio-political questions – where the Serbian Orthodox Church naturally has different moral views and tends to be more conservative – I do not have the impression that this is currently the main problem. But, once again, the enlargement process is only complete when the enlargement process is actually complete – when all the relevant parties have ratified it. And one should not forget that, although NATO membership was an important step, Montenegro’s accession to the EU as a distinct national achievement is something that matters greatly for the Montenegrins’ process of identity and nation-building.
They have, in a sense, left their “Serbian brothers” to deal with their Kosovo-related problems on their own. But ultimately, if EU membership is achieved, that decision will have paid off.